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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Lawyers and technology have an uneasy relationship. Although
some lawyers are early adapters, others take pride in ignoring technology
because they believe it is alien to the practice of law. As Jody R. Westby
observed, lawyers confronted with technology and security issues tend to
have their “eyes glaze over” and “want to call in their ‘IT guy’ and go
back to work.” 1 But this technophobic attitude may no longer just be
harmless conservatism. In the world of growing security risks, ignorance
of technology may lead to violations of lawyers’ fundamental ethical
duties of competence and confidentiality.
[2]
As with other businesses, lawyers are part of a constantly evolving
and interconnected data ecosystem. The pervasiveness of electronic data
in all aspects of commercial and personal life and its easy transmission
through the Internet have not only fundamentally altered the manner in
which lawyers interact with clients and with one another, but potentially
expose confidential and proprietary information to rapid and unauthorized
dissemination. As vast amounts of data are created and stored,
*

Partner, Head of Cyber, Privacy and Data Security Practice at Morris Polich & Purdy,
Los Angeles, California; Certified Information Privacy Professional United States and
European Union (CIPP/US/E); Certified Information Privacy Manager (CIPM).
1

Jody R. Westby, Cybersecurity & Law Firms: A Business Risk, 39 L. PRACTICE MAG. 4,
46 (July–Aug. 2013), available at
http://www.lawpracticemagazine.com/lawpracticemagazine/july_august_2013#pg1,
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confidential data—including attorney-client communications—can be
readily transferred or accessed by unauthorized parties. With rapidly
changing technology and threat vectors, lawyers are increasingly
challenged in maintaining the security of their information and that of
their clients.
[3]
Rapid technological change has been a constant for the practice of
law for at least a generation. E-mail, which in the early 1990s was not
widely used in the profession, is now the main form of communication
within law firms, as well as with counsel and clients outside the firm.
Despite the growth of text messaging, e-mail continues to expand as a
means of business communication. In 2011 there were on average 105 emails sent or received by corporate users per day, and it is predicted that
this will increase to 125 e-mails per day by 2015.2 While in 2011 there
were over 3.1 billion e-mail accounts (of which 788 million were
corporate), it is predicted that in 2015 there will be four billion accounts
(of which over one billion would be corporate).3
[4]
The use of the Internet, which impacts almost every aspect of the
practice of law, has also grown substantially in the last twenty years. In
1995 there were sixteen million users worldwide, in 2005 over a billion,
and as of June 2014 it is estimated that there are over three billion users.4
In the past, lawyers used their own in-house computing resources. But
now, facilitated by the Internet, lawyers frequently use remote
provisioning of computing and storage services known as “cloud
computing.” It is predicted the future will show a 44% annual growth in
archived at http://perma.cc/VBR2-2RAM.
2

See SARA RADICATI & QUOC HOANG, EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2011-2015 3 (2011),
available at http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Email-StatisticsReport-2011-2015-Executive-Summary.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2SLA-4CD8.
3

See id. at 2–3.

4

See Internet Growth Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2014 archived
at http://perma.cc/27N9-68YE.

2

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 3

public cloud workloads, in comparison to an 8.9% annual growth for
computing services located in the premises of businesses.5 In 2014 it was
estimated that there was one exabatye (i.e., 1018 bytes of data) stored in the
cloud, and CISCO predicts data center traffic will triple by 2017.6
[5]
This article argues that because of the evolving security risks
brought by the changes wrought by e-mail, the Internet, and cloud
computing, lawyers must reassess their ethical duties of competence and
confidentiality. Although lawyers may have been comforted by ethical
opinions finding the use of e-mail or cloud computing appropriate in the
past, they can no longer rely on those opinions given dramatically altered
security risks.
[6]
This article also argues that lawyers must develop a greater
awareness of the risks posed by the technology than they have had in the
past because—like their clients—they are subject to rapidly escalating
security threats. Whether they are aware of it or not, lawyers and law
firms are increasingly the target of sophisticated hackers who deliberately
seek out the confidential information they store on behalf of clients. 7
Although lawyers should not (and, indeed, cannot) abandon e-mail and
cloud computing, they must shoulder greater responsibility in protecting
data against evolving security risks. Lawyers must take concrete steps to
protect data which they store for themselves and their clients, including
developing risk management and incident response programs to prepare
for cyberattacks and the consequences of such attacks. As with their
corporate counterparts, security and privacy are no longer a matter for
5

See Jack Woods, 20 Cloud Computing Statistics Every CIO Should Know,
SILICONANGLE (Jan. 27, 2014), http://siliconangle.com/blog/2014/01/27/20-cloudcomputing-statistics-tc0114/, archived at http://perma.cc/GVQ2-MHRR.
6

See id.

7

See, e.g., Andrew Conte, Unprepared Law Firms Vulnerable to Hackers, TRIBLIVE
(Sept. 13, 2014, 10:40 PM), http://triblive.com/news/allegheny/6721544-74/law-firmsinformation#axzz3S2IsKaPf, archived at http://perma.cc/9DUR-HQXF (stating that
computer hackers are targeting top international law firms to steal intellectual property
data and trade secrets).
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specialists, but for all who deal with private, proprietary, and confidential
data—including lawyers.8
II. LAWYERS AND TECHNOPHOBIA
[7]
Although it is unlikely there will ever be a comprehensive study of
the subject, a portion of the legal profession—if not outright Luddites—
are uncomfortable with technology and consider an understanding of its
workings to be unnecessary—if not inimical—to the practice of law.9 In a
1963 article on “Lawyers and Machines,” Colin Tapper observed that
“[l]awyers are traditionally conservative” and resistant to change,
including when it comes to adopting machines for their work.10 Tapper
presciently suggested what we would now call computerized databases
could be useful in the practice of law, but feared that lawyers may be slow
to accept such tools.11 Although Tapper believed technology had brought
8

See, e.g., Richard Blackwell, C-Suite Survey: Cybersecurity Becomes A Top Priority
After Data Breaches, BUS. NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 20, 2014, 10:09 AM),
http://www.bnn.ca/News/2014/10/20/C-Suite-Survey-Cybersecurity-becomes-a-toppriority-after-data-breaches.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/Y4X7-WPHP; see also
JODY R. WESTBY, GOVERNANCE OF ENTERPRISE SECURITY: CYLAB 2012 REPORT: HOW
BOARDS & SENIOR EXECUTIVES ARE MANAGING CYBER RISKS 5–6 (2012), available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CYBER%20Carneigie%20Mellon%20repor
t.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3CXW-4QKM (reporting that boards of directors are
still “not actively addressing cyber risk management”).
9

See Maureen O’Neill, Lawyers Must Conquer Technophobia to Provide Competent
Counsel, DISCOVER READY (May 24, 2012), http://discoverready.com/blog/lawyersmust-conquer-technophobia-to-provide-competent-counsel/, archived at
http://perma.cc/92TG-NLT5; see also Mitch Kowalski, New Legal Tech Audit Will Scare
Lawyers into Embracing Technology, LEGAL POST, (Aug. 29, 2014, 2:12 PM),
http://business.financialpost.com/2014/08/29/new-legal-tech-audit-will-scare-lawyersinto-embracing-technology/, archived at http://perma.cc/U46T-3V35 (“Lawyers have
traditionally revelled in their technophobia—much to their client's chagrin.”); Kenneth N.
Rashbaum et al., Cybersecurity: Business Imperative for Law Firms, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 10,
2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202678493487/Cybersecurity-BusinessImperative-for-Law-Firms, archived at http://perma.cc/2GVN-4XFT (referencing the
“reputed technophobia of many lawyers”).
10

See Colin Tapper, Lawyers and Machines, 26 MOD. L. REV. 121, 122 (1963).
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improvements, including the use of the Dictaphone, he noted that as late as
the 1960s the Chancery Division of the English law courts resisted using
“typewriters, the postal service and telephones.”12
[8]
Like their English counterparts, some U.S. lawyers have
historically been resistant to adopting new technology. When future U.S.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles joined Sullivan & Cromwell in 1911,
telephones and stenographers were not widely accepted and some
“partners felt that the only dignified way of communication between
members of the legal profession was for them to write each other in
Spencerian script,13 and to have the message thus expressed [sic] delivered
by hand.” 14 Clarence Seward, the managing partner of what would
become Cravath, Swaine & Moore “‘sought in vain to save the office from
the machine [including elevators and typewriters], which was destroying
the simplicity of American life.’”15
[9]
Notwithstanding initial resistance, the U.S. legal profession
eventually embraced elevators, typewriters and Dictaphones—as it would
later adopt the Telex, copiers, fax machines, personal computers,
11

See id.

12

Id. at 122 n. 1.

13

Spencerian script was a “script style that was used in the United States from
approximately 1850 to 1925 and was considered the American de facto standard writing
style for business correspondence prior to the widespread adoption of the typewriter.”
Spencerian Script, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spencerian_script, archived
at https://perma.cc/2FHM (last modified June 24, 2014, 12:59 PM).
14

Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the
Promise, 49 DUKE L. J. 147, 164 (1999) (quoting John Foster Dulles, Foreword to
ARTHUR H. DEAN, WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL 1854–1984, at iii (1957)).
15

Id. at 165 (quoting ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS,
1819-1947, at 448 (1946)). Lanctot writes that “[i]n a story so telling that it can only be
apocryphal, one colleague described the time that Seward refused to take an elevator up
four flights to a hearing in federal court and insisted instead on walking. When he finally
arrived at the courtroom, Seward was reportedly so out of breath that the argument had to
be cancelled and the case submitted on the briefs.” Id.
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electronic mail, mobile phones, and electronic research databases. 16
Today’s lawyers are unlikely to reject technology outright, because that
would render them virtually incapable of communicating with one another
and their clients and practicing law. Nonetheless, a substantial number of
lawyers exhibit a sometimes studied indifference to technology, believing
it to be either irrelevant to the practice of law or the purview of nonlawyersincluding the IT department.17
III. SECURITY RISKS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
[10] Given their unsettled relationship with technology, lawyers have
been slow to recognize that hackers have lawyers in their sights as a
potentially easy target. Lawyers who “have a hard enough time just
figuring out how to work their BlackBerry or iPhone” 18 may have
difficulty understanding that they are “basically the same as any other
company when it comes to countering cyberattacks and protecting their
confidential and proprietary data.” 19 But, in fact, lawyers have been
warned for at least the last five years that they are susceptible to
cyberattacks because of the substantial amounts of data they safeguard for
themselves and their clients.20
16

See Robert Ambrogi, A Chronology of Legal Technology, 1842–1995, L. SITES (Feb.
14, 2010), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2010/02/chronology-of-legal-technology1842.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NU4C-NFVX; see also Nicole Black, 10
Technologies That Changed the Practice of Law, MYCASE (July 29, 2014),
http://www.mycase.com/blog/2014/07/10-technologies-changed-practice-law/, archived
at http://perma.cc/SRT5-A6QS.
17

See Westby, supra note 1, at 46–47.

18

Jennifer Smith, Lawyers Get Vigilant on Cybersecurity, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2012,
available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577486761101726748,
archived at http://perma.cc/2V83-AP92.
19

Westby, supra note 1, at 46.

20

See Michael Cooney, FBI Warns of Spear Phishing Attacks on Lawyers, PR Firms,
NETWORKWORLD (Nov. 18, 2009, 3:20 PM),
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[11] As cyberattacks have grown in number, so has the exposure of the
legal profession to such attacks. In the last two years, cyberattacks on
U.S. enterprises have been constantly in the news. 2014 has been
proclaimed the “year of the data breach” because of the well-publicized
attacks on Target, Home Depot, Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE), and
numerous other businesses.21 Even before the SPE breach in November
2014, Forrester Research predicted that “[a]t least 60% of brands will
discover a breach of sensitive data in 2015, with the actual number of
breached entities being as high as 80% or more . . . .”22
[12] The Verizon 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report, which is
based on reported events from 2013, referenced 63,437 reported security
incidents and 1,367 breaches in almost every economic sector. 23 Of
interest to lawyers is the fact that the Verizon Report found that attacks on
“professionals” have grown significantly in recent years with only the
public sector, finance and retail having more security incidents than
professionals in 2013.24
[13] The primary attack vectors for professionals include “denial of
service” (DoS) attacks and cyber espionage. 25 DoS attacks typically
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2232563/security/fbi-warns-of-spear-phishingattacks-on-lawyers--pr-firms.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HDV5-4LXZ.
21

See Tom Huddleston, Jr., The Sony Hack Should Make Cyber Security a Hot
Boardroom Topic, FORTUNE (Dec. 23, 2014, 1:55 PM),
http://fortune.com/2014/12/23/sony-hack-security-boardroom/, archived at
http://perma.cc/R62B-NEUF.
22

60% of Brands Will Discover a Breach of Sensitive Data in 2015, FORRESTER (Nov.
12, 2014),
https://www.forrester.com/60+Of+Brands+Will+Discover+A+Breach+Of+Sensitive+Dat
a+In+2015/-/E-PRE7425, archived at https://perma.cc/C9S6-A88J.
23

See VERIZON, 2014 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2 (2014), available at
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2014/, archived at http://perma.cc/B2KR-4LT9.
24

See id. at 15.
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compromise the availability of networks and systems through network and
computer applications. 26 DoS attacks may be launched by either
individuals or entities, including foreign governments, competitors and
disgruntled employees. The aim of a DoS attack is to slow or shut down
legitimate traffic to the victim’s website.27 Almost any type of business
may be subject to a DoS attack and such attacks may be launched for a
wide variety of reasons, including shutting down a controversial project,
preventing access to financial or other key services, gaining publicity for a
cause, or benefiting a foreign government or competitor.28
[14] Another major source of attacks against professionals is cyber
espionage, in which state-affiliated actors, particularly from Asia and
Eastern Europe, target enterprises to obtain information of competitive or
strategic value. 29 Cyber espionage attacks are often conducted through
malware implanted on computer systems by way of a social engineering
attack, such as “spear-phishing” e-mails.30 In a targeted attack, the user
25

See id.

26

See id. at 43–45.

27

See TIMOTHY J. TOOHEY, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY TRENDS AND DESIGN
PROFESSIONALS 1–2 (Morris Polich & Purdy 2014) [hereinafter PRIVACY AND DATA
SECURITY TRENDS AND DESIGN PROFESSIONALS], available at
http://www.mpplaw.com/files/Publication/c76f880b-a26b-4d33-91ebe629890feeca/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/de6cbf28-77b2-4389-ad01e6a0f3a741eb/DR-Privacy-and-Data-Security-Trends-and-Design-Professionals-TJTJune-2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WKC2-JNDX.
28

See id. at 2; see also Bob Tarzey, Why Would They DoS Us?, COMPUTERWEEKLY
(Feb. 10, 2014, 7:54 AM), http://www.computerweekly.com/cgi-bin/mtsearch.cgi?blog_id=119&tag=Denial-of-service%20attack&limit=20, archived at
http://perma.cc/XYS6-KARF.
29

See, e.g., PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY TRENDS AND DESIGN PROFESSIONALS, supra
note 27, at 2.
30

See Pieter Danhieux, Email Phishing Attacks, OUCH! (Sans Institute), Feb. 2013, at 1,
available at http://www.securingthehuman.org/newsletters/ouch/issues/OUCH201302_en.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M3WW-MCVD.
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typically receives a seemingly bona fide e-mail from what appears to be a
colleague which in fact comes from a hostile party.31 When the recipient
clicks on an executable file in the e-mail, malware is launched that is
implanted into the recipient’s computer system.32
[15] Although some of the details are unclear, the massive breach
against SPE’s computer systems in November and December 2014 is in
key respects akin to a cyber espionage attack. Using malware with the
capability to, among other things, access files stored on a computer
system, the hackers mounted an attack on SPE that created backdoor
access to the system, destroyed and “clean[ed]” computer systems, and
paralyzed the company’s computer systems for weeks. 33 The attack,
which the U.S. attributes to North Korea, arose in conjunction with the
James Franco and Seth Rogen film The Interview which featured a
fictional plot to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. 34 The
attack rendered SPE’s computer system inaccessible, and significant
amounts of sensitive and proprietary data were exfiltrated from its
system.35 The attack also resulted in the release and public distribution of
31

See id.

32

See id. at 1–2.

33

See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Sony Breach May Have Exposed Employee Healthcare, Salary
Data, KREBS ON SECURITY (Dec. 2, 2014, 11:21 AM),
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/12/sony-breach-may-have-exposed-employeehealthcare-salary-data/, archived at http://perma.cc/3TNS-RC67; see also Alert (TA14353A): Targeted Destructive Malware, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM
(Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-353A, archived at
https://perma.cc/KB5E-29AR (analyzing malware used to attack SPE).
34

See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Michael S. Schmidt, More Sanctions on North Korea
After Sony Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2015, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/03/us/in-response-to-sony-attack-us-levies-sanctionson-10-north-koreans.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4QVA-NPKE.
35

See Ben Fritz and Danny Yadron, Sony Hack Exposed Personal Data of Hollywood
Stars, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/sony-pictureshack-reveals-more-data-than-previously-believed-1417734425 archived at
http://perma.cc/6UHK-RQBY.

9

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 3

sensitive attorney-client communications, including materials relating to
labor matters handled by a prominent U.S. law firm, e-mails from SPE
executives, and 47,000 social security numbers of current and former SPE
employees, including actors and directors.36
[16] Social engineering attacks are not limited to those engaging in
cyber espionage. For example, in the 2013 Target hack, a social
engineering attack against one of Target’s vendors launched malware that
allowed cyber criminals in Eastern Europe to obtain credit card
information from Target’s customers at the point of sale (POS). 37 The
malware lurked on Target’s system for weeks and automatically sent
credit card information for 70–110 million individuals to the hackers.38
[17] Cyber espionage attacks are particularly difficult to detect. The
Verizon 2013 Report found that 62% of the attacks took months to
discover and 5% of attacks took years to detect.39 Aside from the SPE
attack, which appears to have been motivated less by economic than
political motives, attacks are typically launched by foreign nation states to
obtain information to allow them to gain advantage for a particular project.
For example, in May 2014 the U.S. Department of Justice announced it
had charged Chinese military hackers with cyber espionage aimed at
36

See id.; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Sony Pictures Hires David Boies, Who Warns
Media to Destroy Documents Leaked by Hackers, ABA Journal (Dec. 15, 2014 11:38
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/sony_pictures_hires_david_boies_who_warns_
media_to_destroy_hacked_documents, archived at http://perma.cc/33FK-8XBZ.
37

See Brian Krebs, Target Hackers Broke in Via HVAC Company, KREBS ON SECURITY
(Feb. 5, 2014, 1:52 PM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/02/target-hackers-broke-in-viahvac-company/, archived at http://perma.cc/F2JR-9ZYE.
38

See Elizabeth A. Harris and Nicole Perlroth, For Target, The Breach Numbers Grow,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/target-breach-affected-70-millioncustomers.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/GH83-UUQD.
39

See VERIZON, supra note 23, at 41.

10

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 3

obtaining “confidential and proprietary technical and design
specifications” from several U.S. companies, including Westinghouse, to
advantage Chinese state-owned enterprises.40
[18] Law firms are far from immune to security attacks, including DoS
and cyber espionage attacks. 41 In its August 2014 cybersecurity
resolution, the ABA found that “[t]he threat of cyber attacks against law
firms is growing” and that “[l]awyers and law firms are facing
unprecedented challenges from the widespread use of electronic records
and mobile devices.”42 Lawyers and law firms are targets because “[t]hey
collect and store large amounts of critical, highly valuable corporate
records, including intellectual property, strategic business data, and
litigation-related theories and records collected through e-[D]iscovery.”43
As a former FBI agent has observed, law firms are vulnerable to attack
because they “‘have incredibly valuable and sensitive information, and the
Internet just provides a whole other methodology through which the
information can be accessed and pilfered.’”44 Lawyers may also be targets
40

See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers
for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for
Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/uscharges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-andlabor, archived at http://perma.cc/XYJ8-DQJX.
41

See Rashbaum et al., supra note 9.

42

JUDITH MILLER AND HARVEY RISHIKOF, ABA, CYBERSECURITY LEGAL TASK FORCE
SECTION OF SCIENCE & TECH. LAW REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (2014),
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/law_national_security/2014annualm
eeting/ABA%20-%20Cyber%20Resolution%20109%20Final.authcheckdam.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/ACE4-GAKC; see also American Bar Association House of
Delegates Adopts Resolutions on Cybersecurity, Domestic Violence, ABA (Aug. 12,
2014), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-newsarchives/2014/08/american_bar_associa.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G9AL-8T9N.
43

MILLER AND RISHIKOF, supra note 42, at 4.

44

Smith, supra note 18 (quoting Shawn Henry, a “FBI veteran former executive assistant
director of the agency's criminal, cyber, response and services branch.”).
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of attacks because “it is generally easier for a hacker to break into a law
firm’s network to steal client data than it is to hack into the clients’
networks to steal the data.”45
[19] Few law firm hacks have been publicized, most likely because the
firms are reluctant publicly to expose their vulnerability and may not
legally be required to inform the public of hacks.46 However, it has been
reported that an unnamed “major New York law firm” was attacked in
2012 by Chinese hackers seeking information about a business deal. 47
When this hack was announced, the FBI “convened a meeting with the top
200 New York City law firms to address the rising number of cyberattacks
on law firms.”48 The FBI reportedly warned lawyers at the meeting “that
they were easy prey for hackers trying to obtain their clients’ valuable
data.”49 Law firms were an “easy target,” according to the FBI, because
“partners insist on mobility—including the ability to review case
documents at home on the weekend or while travelling—which means
highly sensitive documents are routinely transferred by e-mail, leaving
them vulnerable to attack.”50 The FBI informed lawyers at the meeting
that it had “‘seen specific documents from law firms on specific deals
being exfiltrated from cyberattacks.’”51
45

Lynn Watson, At the Crossroads of Lawyering and Technology: Ethics, PRACTICE
INNOVATIONS, July 2012, at 17, 18, available at
http://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/signup/newsletters/practiceinnovations/2013-jan/Jan13_PracticeInnovations.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H67ZNE5F.
46

See Conte, supra note 7.

47

See Mike Mintz, Cyberattacks on Law Firms-A Growing Threat, MARTINDALE.COM
BLOG (Mar. 19, 2012), http://blog.martindale.com/cyberattacks-on-law-firms-a-growingthreat, archived at http://perma.cc/H67Z-NE5F.
48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Smith, supra note 18 (quoting Mary Gallian of the FBI).
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[20] Documents held by law firms are of undoubted interest to hackers.
In some instances, documents originating from law firms have been
exposed when hackers attack a firm’s clients. For example, in the recent
SPE attack, documents originating from a prominent labor and
employment firm were published on the Internet, including documents that
apparently contained details regarding termination of employees. 52 In
another attack said to have been launched by Wikileaks in retaliation for
the claim of a security firm that boasted it could identify individuals
belonging to that hacktivist organization, documents were put on line from
a national law firm relating to representation of clients such as Bank of
America and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.53
IV. LAWYERS’ LEGAL AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS TO SECURE DATA
[21] In common with other enterprises, lawyers are legally required to
secure personal data they hold on behalf of others and for themselves. In
addition to being obligated to secure personal data, lawyers are also
ethically bound as professionals to maintain the confidentiality of client
documents and communications, which is a much broader category than
“personal” information.
A. Lawyers’ Legal Obligations to Secure Data
[22] Federal and state laws impose legal obligations on law firms, like
other enterprises, to implement “reasonable” security measures to protect
data that they store on behalf of themselves and others. These laws also
require enterprises to report any breaches in the security of personal data.
[23]

For example, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81 requires businesses to take

52

See Krebs, supra note 33 (showing screen shot of file tree including references to law
firm and employee data).
53

See Brian Baxter, Hunton & Williams Linked to Hacked E-Mail Affair, AMLAW DAILY
(Feb. 15, 2011, 11:11 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/02/huntonwikileaks.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7RKU-V6LG.
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“reasonable steps to dispose, or arrange for the destruction of customer
records within its custody or control containing personal information.”54
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5 also requires businesses that “own” or
“license” personal information about a California resident to “implement
and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to
the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from
unauthorized access, destruction, use modification, or disclosure.”55 As of
January 1, 2015, California will also require businesses that “maintain”
information on behalf of others to implement such security measures, for
“information that a business maintains but does not own or license.”56
[24] California and forty-seven other states require persons and
businesses, including lawyers, to notify residents regarding breaches of
unencrypted personal information.57 In California, which has led the way
in such data breach notification laws, “personal information” includes (1)
an individual’s first name or first initial and last name in combination with
a social security number, a driver’s license or identification card number,
an account number, credit or debit card number in combination with a
54

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81 (Deering 2005). The statute further requires that records
are to be shredded or erased or that the personal information in the records should be
made “unreadable or undecipherable through any means.”
55

Id. at § 1798.81.5.

56

See A.B. 1710, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014)., available at
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB1710,
archived at http://perma.cc/HL69-CJDV; see also Timothy J. Toohey, California
Modifies Its Data Breach Notification Requirements Again, MORRIS POLICH & PURDY
(Oct. 3, 2014) [hereinafter California Modifies Its Data Breach Notification
Requirements Again], http://privacydatasecurity.com/CA-Modifies-Data-BreachNotification-AB-1710-TJT-10'3'14.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SK3S-8LGD.
57

See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (Deering 2005). A list of the data breach laws is
maintained by the National Conference of State Legislatures. See Security Breach
Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/securitybreach-notification-laws.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/V9JZ-UYJZ (maintaining a list
of data breach laws).
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required security code, access code or password, medical information, or
health insurance information or (2) a user name and e-mail address in
combination with a password or security question and answer that would
permit access to an online account. 58 Moreover, if the personal
information that is breached is not owned by the person or business that
was breached, they must “notify the owner or licensee of the information
of any breach of the security of the data immediately following discovery,
if the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been,
acquired by an unauthorized person.”59 Failures of businesses, including
law firms, to maintain appropriate security or to comply with data breach
notification laws, may subject them to fines and/or lawsuits for damages.60
[25] Federal authorities may also penalize businesses that do not
maintain appropriate security measures. For example, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has broad authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act61
to bring actions against enterprises that do not maintain “reasonable and
appropriate data security for consumers’ sensitive personal information.”62
58

See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(e).

59

Id. at § 1798.82(b).

60

See id. at § 1798.84. For example, the California Attorney General brought an action
against Kaiser Foundation Health Plan alleging that the disclosure of a breach was
unreasonably delayed when personal data was found in a hard drive being sold at a thrift
store. See Ronald W. Breaux, Emily Westridge Black, and Timothy Newman, California
AG Cracks Down on Timing of Data Breach Disclosures, HAYNES BOONE (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.haynesboone.com/california-ag-cracks-down-on-timing-of-data-breachdisclosures-02-04-2014/, archived at http://perma.cc/M8CK-KCWA. Kaiser settled the
matter for $150,000.00. Id.
61

See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) & (2) (2012). The Act declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce . . . .” Id. The FTC's enforcement generally proceeds under either
the “unfairness” prong which focuses on consumer injury or the “deception” prong which
focuses on “[a] representation, omission, or practice [which] misleads or is likely to
mislead the consumer.” See TIMOTHY J. TOOHEY, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY AND DATA
PROTECTION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 107–08 (2014) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION].
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The FTC may take administrative actions against entities that do not
maintain reasonable security measures, which typically result in consent
decrees requiring businesses to put in place a comprehensive security
program and undertake periodic audits or reviews by a certified third party
for up to 20 years.63
[26] Law firms, like other enterprises, are also subject to federal laws
that require implementation of security measures. For example, law firms
may be considered “business associates” under the Health Information
Privacy Protection Act (HIPAA) 64 because they perform functions for
health care clients, such as reviewing documents that contain health care
information.65 As HIPAA business associates, law firms must follow the
62

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 13-1887 (ES), 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 84913, at *1 (D.N.J. June 23, 2014).
63

See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Provider of Medical Transcript Services
Settles FTC Charges That It Failed to Adequately Protect Consumers' Personal
Information (Jan. 31, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/01/provider-medical-transcript-services-settles-ftc-charges-it, archived at
http://perma.cc/K6ST-U33C. The settlement with the company in question (GMR
Transcription) was the 50th data security case settled by the FTC. Id.
64

See Matthew H. Meade, Lawyers and Data Security: Understanding a Lawyer's
Ethical and Legal Obligations That Arise from Handling Personal Information Provided
by Clients, 28 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER 1, 7 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.bipc.com/files/Publication/ae615839-5e8f-4ce6-99afa6aed9bc6a69/Preview/PublicationAttachment/2ea3d9ea-61bc-4324-8cee5df5f01e07dd/CIL_1011_Meade.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2WT5-36J8.
65

According to the United States Department of Health and Human Services, a “business
associate” is “a person or entity that performs certain functions or activities that involve
the use or disclosure of protected health information on behalf of, or provides services to,
a covered entity.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., BUSINESS ASSOCIATES 1
(2009), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/businessassociates.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/8HWY-QNGR. The rules relating to business associates
are set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e) (2014), 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2014), 45 C.F.R.
§164.532(d) (2014) and 45 C.F.R. §164.532(e) (2014). A “covered entity” is a provider
of health care services and “protected health information” (sometimes referred to as PHI)
is all “individually identifiable health information” held or sent by a “covered entity or its
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HIPAA Security Rule66 requiring them to put in place safeguards to secure
electronic protected health information. Although the HIPAA Security
Rule does not require specific security measures, it recommends
implementing procedures to insure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of electronic protected health information to protect against
reasonably anticipated threats and impermissible uses or disclosures, and
to ensure compliance by an entity’s employees. 67 If a law firm is a
HIPAA business associate, it must also report breaches of protected health
information to the United States Department of Health and Human
Services and may be subject to fines for such breaches.68
B. Lawyers’ Ethical Obligations to Maintain Client
Confidences
[27] In addition to being subject to state and federal laws affecting other
enterprises, lawyers also have independent ethical duties requiring them to
be aware of the risks of technology and to implement measures to protect
against unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.
[28] The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“ABA Model
Rules”), which are followed by most states, establish a competence
requirement in Rule 1.1 that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent

business associate, in any form or media, whether electronic, on paper, or oral.” See
Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information in
Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/Deidentification/guidance.html, archived at http://perma.cc/483U-CWKY (last visited Jan.
20, 2014).
66

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1) (2013).

67

See UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION, supra note 61, at 37–38.

68

See California Modifies Its Data Breach Notification Requirements Again, supra note
56, at 37–39.
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representation to a client.” 69 The ABA Model Rules further state
“[c]ompetent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”70 Since 2012, comment 8 to Rule 1.1 has provided that
“[t]o maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep
abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and
risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and
education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to
which the lawyer is subject.”71
[29] Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules establishes the duty for lawyers
to maintain the confidentiality of information and requires that “[a] lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless
the client gives informed consent . . . .”72 Rule 1.6 further provides that
“[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or
unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating
to the representation of a client.”73
[30] Since 2012, comment 18 to ABA Model Rule 1.6(c) has
“require[d] a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information relating
to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third
parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or
other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or
who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision.”74
69

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2014).

70

Id. States have adopted these changes, including Pennsylvania. See Shannon Brown,
Pennsylvania's New, Technology-related Ethics Rule Changes for Lawyers, SHANNON
BROWN LAW (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.shannonbrownlaw.com/archives/2109,
archived at http://perma.cc/Z5V8-2CEK.
71

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2014) (emphasis added).

72

Id. at R. 1.6(a).

73

Id. at R. 1.6(c).

74

Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 18.
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[31] If the lawyer has “made reasonable efforts to prevent the access of
disclosure” the Rule is not violated.75 Comment 18 further states that
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness
of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the
sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if
additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of
employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of
implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the
safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent
clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of
software excessively difficult to use). A client may require
the lawyer to implement special security measures not
required by this Rule or may give informed consent to
forgo security measures that would otherwise be required
by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be required to take
additional steps to safeguard a client’s information in order
to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws
that govern data privacy or that impose notification
requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to,
electronic information, is beyond the scope of these
Rules.76
[32] In Formal Opinion 2010-179, the California Standing Committee
on Professional Responsibility and Conduct addressed an issue similar to
that addressed in the 2012 comments to the ABA Model Rules. Opinion
2010-179 discussed the issue of whether an attorney violates the duties of
confidentiality and competence owed to a client “by using technology to
transmit or store confidential client information when the technology may
be susceptible to unauthorized access by third parties.” 77 The specific
75

Id.

76

Id.

77

State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal
Op. 2010-179 at 1 (discussing whether an attorney violates duties of confidentiality and
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context for the opinion was whether an attorney using a laptop to conduct
legal research and e-mail a client through a public wireless Internet
connection and through the attorney’s personal wireless system violated
any ethical rules.78
[33] Opinion 2010-179 concluded that the use of a public wireless
connection without using precautions, such as encryption or a personal
firewall, risked violating the attorney’s duties of confidentiality and
competence because of the “lack of security features provided in most
public wireless access locations.”79 In contrast, the opinion found that the
use of the attorney’s personal wireless system would not violate the
attorney’s duties if the system were “configured with appropriate security
features.”80
[34] Opinion 2010-179 adopted a flexible analytic approach to
technology, recognizing that technology is “ever-evolving” and is now
integrated in “virtually every aspect of our daily lives.” 81 The opinion
further recognized that “guidance to attorneys in this area has not kept
pace with technology” and “[m]any attorneys, as with a large contingent
of the general public, do not possess much, if any, technological savvy.”82
Although the opinion found it was unnecessary for attorneys to develop a
mastery of the security features and deficiencies of each technology
available, the duties of confidentiality and competence that attorneys owe
competence when using technology to transmit or store confidential client information
that may be susceptible to unauthorized access by third parties), available at
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wmqECiHp7h4%3d&tabid=836,
archived at http://perma.cc/Z2NX-ZWF5.
78

See id.

79

Id. at 7.

80

See id. (noting that features such as firewalls, antivirus and anti-spam software, secure
username and password combinations, and file permissions as “appropriate.”).
81

Id. at 1.

82

Id. at 1, 5.
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to their clients do require a basic understanding of the electronic
protections afforded by the technology they use in their practice. If the
attorney lacks the necessary competence to assess the security of the
technology, he or she must seek additional information or consult with
someone who possesses the necessary knowledge, such as an information
technology consultant.83
[35] Opinion 2010-179 further emphasized that attorneys must ensure
that law firm personnel are “appropriately instructed regarding client
confidentiality and are supervised in accordance with rule 3-110.” 84
Because of “the evolving nature of technology and differences in security
features that are available, the attorney must ensure the steps are sufficient
for each form of technology being used and must continue to monitor the
efficacy of such steps.”85
[36] California Formal Opinion 2010-179, combined with the 2012
revisions to the ABA Model Rules, place an affirmative obligation on
lawyers not merely to be generally aware of the risks of technology, but to
understand how risks relating to a specific technology are evolving. A
technology that may have been safe when it was introduced may no longer
be secure if risks have developed that undermine confidentiality
protections.
[37] In addition, both the ABA Model Rules and California Formal
Opinion 2010-179 place an obligation on lawyers to implement a security
83

State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op.
2010-179 at 5, (emphasis added) (citing Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, R. 3-110(C) (2013)
(“If a member does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal service is
undertaken, the member may nonetheless perform such services competently by (1)
associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer
reasonably believed to be competent, or (2) by acquiring sufficient learning and skill
before performance is required.”)), available at
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wmqECiHp7h4%3d&tabid=836,
archived at http://perma.cc/F337-JV48.
84

Id. at 6.

85

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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program protecting confidential data. Although the precise elements will
differ for each lawyer or firm, a security program should include
governance standards, “development of security strategies, plans, policies
and procedures; creation of inventories of digital assets; selection of
security controls; determination of technical configuration settings;
performance of annual audits; and delivery of training.”86 Lawyers and
law firms should also put in place a cyber response plan allowing them to
detect problems, determine the cause of the problem, and resolve the
problem. 87 As the ABA Cybersecurity Task Force has recommended,
response plans “should be able to accommodate the full array of threats,
not just data breaches.”88 Finally, as both the ABA Model Rules and the
California Opinion 2010-179 recognize, law firms must put training
programs in place to ensure that law firm personnel are aware of security
risks and know how to help prevent cyberattacks.
V. LAWYERS’ USE OF E-MAIL
[38] E-mail has become the most frequently used means of
communicating within law offices and to clients, obtaining electronic
alerts regarding deadlines and court filings, coordination of meetings, and
accessing seemingly endless announcements of CLE seminars and
communications from vendors. Because of its ubiquity, many lawyers
likely believe that e-mail poses few ethical or security risks, other than the
inadvertent use of “reply all.”
[39] State bar associations addressing the ethics of e-mail have
generally given it a green light, including lawyer use of Internet-based email services, such as Gmail or Yahoo! Mail. Notwithstanding these
opinions, e-mail poses significant ethical challenges for lawyers,
particularly in preserving the confidentiality of communications because
of security risks associated with its transmission and storage. Some web86

MILLER AND RISHIKOF, supra note 42, at 6.

87

See id. at 6.

88

See id. at 9.
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based e-mail providers—including Gmail—present additional challenges,
because these services use e-mail content to target advertising to users and
have taken the position that users have no privacy in e-mails. Finally,
unencrypted e-mail entails substantial security risks, including
dissemination of private communications to third parties.
A. Lawyers’ Ethical Obligations and E-mail
[40] The use of unencrypted e-mail by lawyers received the blessing in
1999 of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility (“ABA Standing Committee”). 89 In Formal
Opinion 99-413, the ABA Standing Committee concluded that “[a] lawyer
may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (1998) because the mode of transmission
affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a technological and legal
standpoint.”90 In reaching the conclusion, Opinion 99-413 found “[t]he
same privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail, land-line telephonic
transmissions, and facsimiles applies to Internet e-mail.”91
[41] From today’s perspective, the conclusion in Opinion 99-413 that email has the “same privacy” as mail is not merely “obsolete,” but
misguided.92 The fact that e-mails can be saved electronically and readily
forwarded (deliberately or inadvertently) to third parties, makes them
considerably less secure than mail, facsimiles, and telephone calls. To
take but one current example, the embarrassing e-mails disseminated
through the SPE hack that have threatened the careers of several
89

The ABA’s opinion was preceded by those of other organizations, including state bar
associations. See Rebecca Bolin, Symposium, Risky Mail: Concerns in Confidential
Attorney-Client Email, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 601, 616–18 (2012).
90

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (discussing
protection of confidentiality of unencrypted e-mail).
91

Id.

92

See Bolin, supra note 89, at 603, 618.
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prominent executives—including the co-chairman of the company—
would not have come to light if the executives in question had confined
their views to a telephone conversation or a note sent by mail.93
[42] In reaching its 1999 conclusion regarding e-mail privacy, the ABA
Standing Committee relied on a 1998 article by David Hricik with the
comforting title E-mail and Client Confidentiality: Lawyers Worry Too
Much about Transmitting Client Confidences by Internet E-mail.94 As has
been noted by other commentators, Professor Hricik’s reassuring
conclusions regarding e-mail privacy and confidentiality depended on the
then state of e-mail technology. In the mid and late 1990’s, e-mails
typically traveled to personal computers with limited storage space.
Service providers like AOL “deleted mail off [their] servers after a few
days to save on then-expensive storage.” 95 In contrast, storage space
today is extremely inexpensive and recipients often preserve vast numbers
of sent and received e-mails for many years. E-mails are routinely backed
up on an enterprise’s servers and can be accessed—like those of SPE—by
malicious parties or disseminated by careless insiders. Moreover, e-mails
sent from web-based services such as Gmail, Yahoo!, or Outlook may be
stored indefinitely in large numbers in the cloud and may thus exist
“without a user’s knowledge as an archival or back-up copy.”96
[43]

In 2011, the ABA Standing Committee issued an opinion that

93

See Daniel Miller, Future of Sony's Amy Pascal Questioned After Hacked Email
Revelations, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2014, 6:20 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-sony-amy-pascalapologizes-20141212-story.html#page=1, archived at http://perma.cc/2JAM-JLCY.
94

See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999)
(discussing confidentiality of unencrypted e-mail) (citing David Hricik, E-mail and
Client Confidentiality: Lawyers Worry Too Much about Transmitting Client Confidences
by Internet E-mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 479 (1998)).
95

Bolin, supra note 89, at 609.

96

See id., at 611–12.
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qualified its 1999 opinion regarding the propriety of e-mail use. 97 In
Formal Opinion 11-459, the ABA Standing Committee concluded that
lawyers:
[S]ending or receiving substantive communications with a
client via e-mail or other electronic means ordinarily must
warn the client about the risk of sending or receiving
electronic communications using a computer or other
device, or e-mail account, where there is a significant risk
that a third party may gain access.98
Opinion 11-459 specifically cautioned lawyers about having their clients
communicate with them using an employer’s computer or device because
employers “often have policies reserving a right of access to employees’
e-mail correspondence via the employer’s e-mail account, computers or
other devices, such as smartphones and tablet devices, from which their
employees correspond.” 99 Opinion 11-459 also recognized that e-mail
subject to access by third parties may compromise a lawyer’s ethical
duties to preserve client confidences.100
B. Lawyers’ Use of Web-Based E-mail
[44] Although many lawyers rely on enterprise e-mail systems run by
their law firms, other lawyers—particularly those in small to medium size
firms—may use web-based e-mail systems such as Gmail, Outlook,
Yahoo! Mail, or AOL. Particularly popular is Google’s Gmail, which is
97

See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011)
(discussing the duty to protect confidentiality of e-mail communications with clients),
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
11_459_nm_formal_opinion.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/UG3HFVCX; see also Bolin, supra note 89, at 622.
98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.
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free and offers 1 GB of storage.101 An analyst estimated 60% of mid-size
companies had their e-mail hosted by Google in 2014 and that 92% of
startups or very small companies use Google.102 From the point of view of
their ethical obligations, lawyers may have concerns that Google scans emails to provide targeted advertising to its users. For example, a lawyer
using Gmail to communicate with a client regarding a meeting at a
particular hotel may find that she is being targeted with advertisements for
that hotel. Although this sort of advertising may be innocuous, there may
be greater concerns if advertisements are based on more sensitive content,
such as a client’s medical condition or employment relationship with a
particular company.
1. The Ethics of Gmail
[45] In 2008, the New York State Bar Association Committee on
Professional Ethics in Ethics Opinion 820 addressed the question of
whether lawyers may use programs that scan e-mails. 103 Although the
opinion did not mention Gmail by name, it clearly referenced the service
by posing the question of whether “a lawyer [may] use an e-mail service
provider that scans e-mails by computer for keywords and then sends or
displays instantaneously (to the side of the e-mails in question) computergenerated advertisements to users of the service based on the e-mail
communications.”104
101

See Lots of free storage, GOOGLE,
https://www.gmail.com/intl/en_us/mail/help/features.html#storage, archived at
https://perma.cc/6NDC-NKBC (last modified Apr. 14, 2014) (indicating that users get
15GB of free storage across Gmail, Google Drive, and Google+ Photos).
102

See Dan Frommer, Google is Stealing away Microsoft's Future Corporate Customers,
QUARTZ (Aug. 1, 2014), http://qz.com/243321/google-is-stealing-away-microsoftsfuture-corporate-customers/, archived at http://perma.cc/WB79-W9LT.
103

See New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 820 (2008) (discussing
use of e-mail services that scan e-mail for advertising purposes), available at
http://old.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&template=/CM/Conte
ntDisplay.cfm&ContentID=55868, archived at http://perma.cc/XB8V-JCGJ.
104

Id.
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[46] Ethics Opinion 820 found the “risks posed to client confidentiality
[by the e-mail service] are not meaningfully different from the risks in
using other e-mail service providers that do not employ this practice”
because “no individuals other than e-mail senders and recipients read the
e-mail messages.”105 The opinion further stated that the committee would
have reached “the opposite conclusion if the e-mails were reviewed by
human beings or if the service provider reserved the right to disclose the emails or the substance of the communications to third parties without the
sender’s permission (or a lawful judicial order).”106
2. Gmail and Google’s Terms of Service
[47] The conclusion that Google’s Gmail passes ethical muster because
no human being reviews e-mails does not address all the potential risks
posed by web-based e-mail services. For example, Ethics Opinion 820 did
not discuss the implications that Google’s Terms of Service (“TOS”),
privacy policies, and other Google statements regarding e-mail privacy
have on expectations of privacy in Gmail.
[48] E-mail providers’ policies and terms of service have been called
“the persistent elephant in the room” regarding e-mail privacy. 107 The
current version of Google’s TOS—which applies not only to Gmail, but to
105

Id.

106

Id.; see also Kevin Raudebaugh, Trusting the Machines: New York State Bar Ethics
Opinion Allows Attorneys to Use Gmail, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 83, 90–91 (2010).
The Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility also found that the use of Gmail is acceptable. Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2011-200 (2011), available
at http://forctlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/PA-opinion-2011-200.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/U6GM-EEG6 (discussing ethical obligations for attorneys
using cloud computing software as a service).
107

Bolin, supra note 89, at 640–41 (“The assumed privacy protections [for e-mail] are
now hazy or even hostile to privacy interests, and the assumed practices to keep e[-]mail
confidential will obviously depend on the privacy policy. Today’s user should be very
concerned about the case-specific policies relating to e[-]mail.”).
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all of Google’s “Services,” including popular cloud-based products such
as Google Apps—contains several provisions that may impact lawyers’
expectations of privacy and confidentiality in their communications to
clients.108
[49] For example, although Google’s TOS states that users “retain
ownership of any intellectual property rights that [they] hold in . . .
content” that is uploaded, submitted, stored, send or received through its
services, it also states that users
[G]ive Google (and those we work with) a worldwide
license to use, host, store, reproduce, modify, create
derivative works (such as those resulting from translations,
adaptations or other changes we make so that your content
works better with our Services), communicate, publish,
publicly perform, publicly display and distribute such
content.109
This “license”110 is “for the limited purpose of operating, promoting, and
improving our Services, and to develop new ones.”111
[50] Regarding targeted advertising, Google's TOS states that “[o]ur
automated systems analyze your content (including e[-]mails) to provide
you personally relevant product features, such as customized search
results, tailored advertising, and spam and malware detection. This
analysis occurs as the content is sent, received, and when it is stored.”112
108

See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/,
archived at http://perma.cc/7R26-WU66 (last modified April 14, 2014) [hereinafter
Google Terms of Service].
109

Id.

110

See Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning—Professional
Ethics at the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111, 248–49 (2011)
(expressing doubt that a “license” is indeed created through the Google TOS).
111

Google Terms of Service, supra note 108.

28

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 3

[51] Google also reserves the right to “suspend or stop a Service
altogether,” although “where reasonably possible, we will give you
reasonable advance notice and a chance to get information out of that
Service.”113 Google further disclaims all warranties and reserves the right
to “modify these terms or any additional terms that apply to a Service . . .
.”114 Google also warns that it may modify the terms in the future and
requests users to “look at [its] terms regularly.” 115 If a user does not
“agree to the modified terms for a Service, [the user] should discontinue . .
. use of the Service.”116
[52] A lawyer using Gmail may have concerns regarding several
aspects of Google’s TOS, including the company’s unilateral right to
“communicate, publish, publicly perform, publicly display and distribute”
the content of potentially privileged or confidential e-mails.117 Although
publication is ostensibly for the “limited purpose” of “operating,
promoting, and improving our Services, and to develop new ones,” the
provision is broad enough to encompass several troubling scenarios,
including Google’s analyzing attorney-client privilege documents to
establish a new product aimed at lawyers.118 Lawyers may also be given
pause by the fact that Google can unilaterally suspend services, disclaim
all warranties, and place the onus of determining whether the TOS has
changed on the users of the service whose only option if they agree with

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Google Terms of Service, supra note 108.

118

Id.
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the new TOS is to quit using Gmail.119
3. Gmail Users’ Expectations of Privacy
[53] Nothing in Google’s TOS states that users have any expectation of
privacy for the electronic communications they send or receive through
Gmail. Indeed, Google has taken the position that individuals sending emails to Gmail accounts have no expectation of privacy. When Google
was sued in federal court in 2010 for violating state and federal antiwiretapping laws for intercepting, reading and acquiring the content of emails sent or received by Gmail users while the e-mails were in transit,
Google argued in a motion to dismiss the complaint that those sending emails to Gmail users had consented to Google processing their messages,
including accessing the content of messages. 120 Google stated in the
motion that
Just as a sender of a letter to a business colleague cannot be
surprised that the recipient’s assistant opens the letter,
people who use web-based e-mail today cannot be
surprised if their communications are processed by the
recipient’s E[lectronic] C[ommunication] S[ervice]
provider in the course of delivery. Indeed, “a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”121

119

See Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 248–49 (prior Google TOS created an
“[i]ncreased [r]isk of [i]nadvertent [g]rant of [l]icense to [c]lient’s [i]ntellectual
[p]roperty” and raised a “serious ethical risk[] for a law firm or lawyers that use, or allow
their staff to use, Google Docs when generating or revising documents that contain client
confidential data and content in which the client has intellectual property rights”).
120

See Steven Musil, Google Filing Says Gmail Users Have No Expectation of Privacy,
CNET (Aug. 13, 2013, 7:57 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/google-filing-says-gmailusers-have-no-expectation-of-privacy/, archived at http://perma.cc/EKG4-X9XL.
121

Defendant Google Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Individual and
Class Action Complaint at 19, In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 5:13-md-02430-LHK
(N.D. Cal. June 6, 2013) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)),
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Google further argued that “the automated processing of e[-]mail is so
widely understood and accepted that the act of sending an e[-]mail
constitutes implied consent to automated processing as a matter of law.”122
[54] In rejecting Google’s argument, the court found that there was no
support for Google’s “far-reaching proposition” that users do not have an
expectation in privacy when using a web-based e-mail service. 123 The
court instead held that senders only “consent[] to the intended recipient’s
recording of the e-mail—not, as has been alleged here, interception by a
third-party service provider.”124
Google has cited no case that stands for the proposition that
users who send e[-]mails impliedly consent to interceptions
and use of their communications by third parties other than
the intended recipient of the e[-]mail. . . . Accepting
Google’s theory of implied consent—that by merely
sending e[-]mails to or receiving e[-]mails from a Gmail
user, a non-Gmail user has consented to Google’s
interception of such e[-]mails for any purposes—would
eviscerate the rule against interception.125

available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/googlemotion061313.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/J46Z-SZRM.
122

Id.

123

See In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
172784, at *55–57 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013).
124

Id. at 55–56 (emphasis added).

125

Id. at 56. Although Judge Koh rejected many of Google’s arguments in its motion to
dismiss, she later denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, finding that many of the
issues regarding implied consent were factual in nature and thus created substantial
differences among class members. See In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD02430-LHK, 2014 WL 1102660, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014).
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[55] Google’s argument that those who send e-mails to Gmail users
have no expectation of privacy may raise red flags for lawyers using
Gmail to make or receive confidential client communications. The fact
that Google has not only taken that position but also makes no
commitment to preserve the privacy of communications sent through
Gmail raises doubts as to whether lawyers using Gmail can reasonably
comply with their duty of confidentiality.126 Although Google—like most
companies—has a privacy policy, that policy only restricts the manner in
which Google shares personal information with “companies, organizations
and individuals outside of Google.” 127 Google’s privacy policy does not
restrict Google’s own use of personal information and is inapplicable to
sensitive or confidential information, such as attorney-client
communications, that contains no “personal” information.128
[56] In arguing that those who send e-mails through Gmail have no
expectation of privacy, Google cited the controversial “third party
doctrine” set forth in the 1979 case of Smith v. Maryland.129 Under the
third party doctrine, an individual voluntarily turning over information to a
third party assumes the risk that the third party will turn the information
126

The protection of users’ e-mails by the Electronic Communication Privacy Act
(ECPA) and the Stored Communications Act (SCA) of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. is
beyond the scope of this article, but is widely discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Jacob M.
Small, Storing Documents in the Cloud: Toward an Evidentiary Privilege Protecting
Papers and Effects Stored on the Internet, 23 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 255, 266 (2013).
127

Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/, archived at
http://perma.cc/ZGP6-B357 (last modified Dec. 19, 2014) (emphasis added). Google
states that it shares personal information with “companies, organizations and individuals
outside of Google” only with users’ consent, with domain administrators, for external
processing, and for legal reasons. Id.
128

See id. “Personal information” is defined in Google’s Privacy Policy as “information
which you provide to us which personally identifies you, such as your name, e[-]mail
address or billing information, or other data which can be reasonably linked to such
information by Google.” Key Terms, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/key-terms/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7VR37X5 (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
129

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
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over to another party and thus has no expectation of privacy in the
information.130 As argued by Google (but rejected by the district court),
Gmail users may not have an expectation of privacy or confidentiality in
e-mail messages because Google reserves the right to access or “process”
the e-mails.
[57] Although the Supreme Court has yet to address applicability of the
third party doctrine to the digital world, it may have an opportunity to do
so in the context of challenges to the National Security Agency’s mass
collection of telephony metadata that was the centerpiece of Edward
Snowden’s 2013 revelations regarding NSA practices.131 The two federal
courts that have addressed the constitutionality of the NSA’s program to
date have reached opposite results.132
4. E-mail Security Risks.
[58] Although some lawyers may not be concerned about Google’s
reliance on the third party doctrine (which was rejected by the court in the
Gmail litigation), they may nonetheless have concerns regarding the more
general security risks posed by unauthorized distribution of confidential emails by insiders and outsiders. Because e-mail can be readily forwarded
either deliberately or accidentally to third parties, it is far less secure than
130

See id. at 743–44.

131

See THE WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER BULK COLLECTION OF
TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT (2013),
available at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Section215.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/7YMA-7ZAN.
132

In Klayman v. Obama, the court found that the program was unconstitutional because
technological advances have made the third party doctrine inapplicable. Klayman v.
Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 2013). A week later, the court in American Civil
Liberties Union v. Clapper reached the opposite conclusion. American Civil Liberties
Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Jack Lerner et al.,
The Duty of Confidentiality in the Surveillance Age, 17 J. INTERNET L., Apr. 2014, at 17
(arguing that lawyers’ duty of confidentiality may be compromised by NSA programs
and that “NSA surveillance revelations require attorneys to re-evaluate the security of
communications over the Internet and ‘in the cloud.’”).
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using postal servicesas the SPE executives discovered when their
embarrassing e-mails were revealed by hackers.133 Although mail may be
misaddressed or misdelivered, there is no “reply all” button for postal
mail, nor is it generally subject to being stolen by malicious outsiders.
[59] As earlier discussed, hackers often use social engineering
techniques, including “spear-fishing,” which is typically delivered through
e-mails, to try to obtain valuable or confidential information. Through
these techniques, hackers may gain access not only to e-mails, but to
documents containing personal, proprietary or confidential information in
the entire computer system.134
[60] The security of e-mail also rests to a large extent on the security of
passwords, which offer little protection against hackers. Like other forms
of personal information, hackers are interested in passwords because they
provide a means to access banking and retail accounts. Because many
individuals use the same password for several accounts, hackers seek
users’ passwords either through “phishing” or hacks of large numbers of
stored passwords. For example, a hack in 2013 of the online dating
service Cupid Media “exposed more than 42 million consumer records,
including names, e[-]mail addresses, unencrypted passwords and birthdays
. . . .”135 In 2012, a Russian hacker site posted 6.5 million passwords
hacked from LinkedIn. 136 The “Heartbleed” bug in 2014 infected the
technology that encrypts communications with websites and exposed
millions of passwords.137
133

See Miller, supra note 93.

134

See Danhieux, supra note 30; Cooney, supra note 20.

135

Brian Krebs, Cupid Media Hack Exposed 42M Passwords, KREBS ON SECURITY (Nov.
20, 2013), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/11/cupid-media-hack-exposed-42mpasswords/, archived at http://perma.cc/S69D-UHPN.
136

See Sara Gates, LinkedIn Password Hack: Check to See if Yours Was One of the 6.5
Million Leaked, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2012, 11:25 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/linkedin-password-hackcheck_n_1577184.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HS5F-VEX3.
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[61] The evolving security threats to e-mail undermine the assumptions
of prior opinions finding that e-mail is an ethical means of communicating
client confidential information. As with all technology, lawyers must base
their considerations of what is reasonable to preserve client confidences
not on past parameters, but on the current state of technology and security
risks. 138 Because of current security concerns, lawyers should consider
whether the use of unencrypted e-mail for sensitive and confidential
communications fulfills their ethical duties.
VI. LAWYERS’ USE OF CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICES
[62] “Cloud computing” is a vague and frequently misunderstood
marketing term. For example, in a recent Dilbert cartoon the perennial
malingerer Wally told the “Pointy Haired Boss,” “[i]f you need me, I’ll be
in the cloud fixing a software issue.” He also told his boss that because
“[t]here’s no cell coverage in the cloud, so it might seem to you as if I am
at home doing nothing.”139
[63] In point of fact, the “cloud” is not located in the sky (or in Wally’s
home) but is instead a name for the outsourcing of computing functions
through servers owned by “cloud computing providers” and not by
companies themselves.140 Customers, including law firms, realize benefits
from such outsourcing, including cost savings that “allow businesses to
avoid the burden of the security and management responsibilities
associated with data storage, as well as the complexities of maintaining the
137

See Brian Krebs, “Heartbleed” Bug Exposes Passwords, Web Site Encryption Keys,
KREBS ON SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2014), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/04/heartbleed-bugexposes-passwords-web-site-encryption-keys/, archived at http://perma.cc/4CM7-RP8M.
138

See Bolin, supra note 89, at 622.

139

Scott Adams, Comics, DILBERT (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.dilbert.com/2014-12-08/,
archived at http://perma.cc/G8L6-P5MQ.
140

See Kenneth L. Bostick, Pie in the Sky: Cloud Computing Brings an End to the
Professional Paradigm in the Practice of Law, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1375, 1381–82, 1384–
85 (2012).
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infrastructure under which the data is held.”141
[64] According to the working definition of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), “[c]loud computing is a model for
enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released
with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” 142
There are several varieties of cloud computing services, including: cloud
software as a service (SaaS), which allows users to run software through a
cloud infrastructure; cloud platform as a service (PaaS), which allows
users to run their own applications using the programming language
provided by the service; and cloud infrastructure as a service (IaaS), which
allows “the consumer . . . to provision processing, storage, networks, and
other fundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to
deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems
and applications.”143
[65] The most frequent law firm uses of the cloud are running software
applications (such as word processing, spreadsheets, and accounting) and
storing documents. For example, lawyers, like other consumers, may use
Amazon’s Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) to store documents,144 or
Google’s Docs, Sheets and Slides (available through Google’s web
browser Chrome) to create documents, spreadsheets and presentation
slides.145 Such services are generally referred to as “public clouds,” in
141

Id. at 1376; see also Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 164–65 (describing the
history of use of cloud services); Woods, supra note 5 (describing the exponential growth
of cloud computing services in recent years).
142

PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2
(2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/ENM9-B4MQ.
143

Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 168.

144

See Amazon S3, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/s3/, archived at
https://perma.cc/2L3D-5TED (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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other words, services offered to the general public. 146 In addition, law
firms may also use free document sharing servicessuch as Dropbox or
Boxfor a wide variety of purposes.147
[66] Law firms also make use of “private clouds,” which are off-site
servers not generally available to the public which the firm pays a third
party to manage. 148 Law firms use private clouds for wide variety of
services, including accounting, software, and storage of documents. 149
Although the following discussion concentrates on the use of the public
cloud, it applies in certain respectsincluding security and control
issuesto private clouds.
A. Ethics of Lawyers’ Use of Public Cloud Computing
Services
[67] Bar organizations have generally concluded that lawyers may
entrust confidential documents to cloud computing providers if certain
conditions are met. The nineteen different state bodies 150 that have
145

See Edit Office Files in Google Docs, Sheets, and Slides, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/docs/answer/6049100?hl=en, archived at
https://perma.cc/35UT-4WTP (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
146

See Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 170.

147

See Law Firm File Sharing in 2014, LEXISNEXIS 6 (May 28, 2014), available at
http://www.slideshare.net/BusinessofLaw/lexisnexis-2014-survey-of-lfile-sharingsurvey-report-final, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8KM-WAK6. The report also found
that lawyers were often unaware of whether other lawyers in their firm used file-sharing
services. Id. at 7.
148

See Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 170.

149

See Stephanie L. Kimbro & Tom Mighell, Popular Cloud Computing Services for
Lawyers: Practice Management Online, L. PRAC. MAG., Sept./Oct. 2011, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_magazine/2011/september_octob
er/popular_cloud_computing_services_for_lawyers.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/WEW7-2HWS (listing numerous cloud applications available to
lawyers).
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reviewed the issue to date have found cloud computing ethical if lawyers
“take reasonable steps to ensure that their law firm’s confidential data is
protected from unauthorized third party access.”151
[68] For example, Iowa Ethics Opinion 11-01, which addressed issues
of confidentiality in the cloud, concluded that
A lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the
information from coming into the hands of unintended
recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the
lawyer use special security measures if the method of
communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Special circumstances, however, may warrant special
precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the lawyer’s expectation of
confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information
and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is
protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement.152
150

See Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/res
ources/charts_fyis/cloud-ethics-chart.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TJU8-JQF2 (last
visited Jan. 5, 2015).
151

Nicole Black, The Ethics of Cloud Computing for Lawyers, ABA (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2012/september_2012/ethics_cl
oud_computing_lawyers.html, archived at http://perma.cc/B285-7NAD; see also Thomas
G. Wilkinson Jr., Ethics Digest, 34 PA. LAW. 49, 49 (2012) (discussing Pennsylvania Bar
Association Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee Formal Opinion
2011–200); Robert Ambrogi, Cloud Ethics Opinions: A Full List (Maybe), LAW SITES
BLOG (May 23, 2014), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2014/05/cloud-ethics-opinions-fulllist.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5SLB-W8WR.
152

Letter from Nick Critelli, Comm. Chair, Iowa State Bar Ass’n Ethics & Practice
Guidelines Comm., to Dwight Dinkla, Exec Dir. Iowa State Bar Ass’n (Sept. 9, 2011)
(quoting Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.6), available at http://www.wicsec.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011%20WICSEC%20Conference%20Materials/M6%20Iowa%20Bar%20Ethics%20Opinion%209911%20-%20Worley,%20Peiper.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/NTS7-5CAH; Black, supra note 151 (analyzing Iowa State
Bar Association’s opinion).
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[69] Opinion 842 of the New York State Bar Association Committee on
Professional Ethics similarly addressed the ethical propriety of cloud
computing.153 Opinion 842 concluded that use of online systems to store
confidential information implicated Rule 1.6’s confidentiality requirement,
but found that a lawyer can use a cloud service to store client files
“provided that the lawyer takes reasonable care to ensure that the system is
secure and that client confidentiality will be maintained.”154
[70] Opinion 842 found that necessary “[r]easonable care . . . may
include consideration” of four issues:
(1) Ensuring that the online data storage provider has an
enforceable obligation to preserve confidentiality and
security, and that the provider will notify the lawyer if
served with process requiring the production of client
information;
(2) Investigating the online data storage provider’s security
measures, policies, recoverability methods, and other
procedures to determine if they are adequate under the
circumstances;
(3) Employing available technology to guard against
reasonably foreseeable attempts to infiltrate the data
that is stored; and/or
(4) Investigating the storage provider’s ability to purge and
wipe any copies of the data, and to move the data to a
different host, if the lawyer becomes dissatisfied with
the storage provider or for other reasons changes
storage providers.155
153

See New York State Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 842 (2010), available at
http://old.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&ContentID=140010&t
emplate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/P6P8-CJKR (using
outside online storage provider to store client confidential information).
154

Id.

155

Id.
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[71] Opinion 842 cautioned that “[t]echnology and security of stored
data are changing rapidly” and that “the lawyer should periodically
reconfirm that the provider’s security measures remain effective in light of
advances in technology.”156 The lawyer also has the duty, if he or she
learns that security measures are ineffective, to “investigate whether there
has been any breach of his or her clients’ confidential information, notify
any affected clients, and discontinue use of the service unless the lawyer
receives assurances that any security issues have been sufficiently
remediated.”157 Lawyers must also monitor the law relating to technology,
which “is changing rapidly,” to see “when using technology may waive an
otherwise applicable privilege.”158
[72] New York Opinion 842 echoes the approach to technology taken in
California Ethics Opinion 2010-179.159 Although the California opinion
dealt with the propriety of a lawyer using public and home wireless
technology, its conclusion that lawyers must be cognizant of the effect of
changing technology and security threats is equally applicable to cloud
computing. As Opinion 2010-179 states, “[t]he greater the sensitivity of
the information, the less risk the attorney should take with technology. If
the information is of a highly sensitive nature and there is a risk of
disclosure when using a particular technology, the attorney should
consider alternatives unless the client provides informed consent.” 160
Moreover, “if a particular technology lacks essential security features, use
156

Id.

157

Id.

158

Id. (citing City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762–63 (2010) (dealing with
expectations of privacy in mobile technology as an example of changes that may affect
privilege)).
159

See Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 192–93.

160

State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal
Op. 2010-179 (2010), available at
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wmqECiHp7h4%3d&tabid=836,
archived at http://perma.cc/4BKQ-HL3Z.
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of such a technology could be deemed to have waived [attorney-client]
protections. Where the attorney-client privilege is at issue, failure to use
sufficient precautions may be considering in determining waiver.”161
B. Security Risks of Lawyers’ Use of Public Cloud Computing
Services
[73] Although the California, Iowa and New York ethics opinions
require lawyers to assess—and continue to assess—the security features of
cloud computing providers, lawyers may have difficulties in fulfilling this
obligation with major public cloud providers. As with e-mail, the standard
policies of many public cloud providers—including Amazon and
Google—make it challenging for lawyers to determine whether these
services have the security measures required by ethics opinions.
[74] For example, Google’s TOS states that Google provides its
services “using a commercially reasonable level of skill and care.” 162
Notwithstanding this commitment, Google’s TOS states (in all capital
letters) “NEITHER GOOGLE NOR ITS SUPPLIERS OR
DISTRIBUTORS MAKE ANY SPECIFIC PROMISES ABOUT THE
SERVICES.
FOR EXAMPLE, WE DON’T MAKE ANY
COMMITMENTS ABOUT THE CONTENT WITHIN THE SERVICES,
THE SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS OF THE SERVICES, OR THEIR
RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY, OR ABILITY TO MEET YOUR
NEEDS. WE PROVIDE THE SERVICES ‘AS IS.’” 163 Google also
excludes all warranties and further states (again in all capital letters)
“WHEN PERMITTED BY LAW, GOOGLE AND GOOGLE’S
SUPPLIERS AND DISTRIBUTORS, WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR LOST PROFITS, REVENUES, OR DATA, FINANCIAL LOSSES
OR INDIRECT, SPECIAL CONSEQUENTIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
161

Id.; see also Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 192–93 (discussing the applicability
of ethical opinions to cloud computing).
162

Google Terms of Service, supra note 108.

163

Id.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES.”164
[75] Under the heading “Business uses of our Services,” Google’s TOS
states that a “business accepts these terms” and
[W]ill hold harmless and indemnify Google and its
affiliates, officers, agents, and employees from any claim,
suit or action arising from or related to the use of the
Services or violation of these terms, including any liability
or expense arising from claims, losses, damages, suits
judgments, litigation costs and attorneys’ fees.165
[76] Google’s TOS also incorporates the company’s privacy policy,166
which includes a section on “information security” stating that, generally,
“[w]e work hard to protect Google and our users from unauthorized access
to or unauthorized alteration, disclosure or destruction of information we
hold.” 167 Google’s privacy policy also states that it encrypts certain
services using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), offers two step verification
and a safe browsing feature in Google Chrome, and reviews its
“information collection, storage and processing practices, including
physical security measures, to guard against unauthorized access to
systems.”168 Finally, Google restricts “access to personal information to
Google employees, contractors and agents who need to know that
information in order to process it for us, and who are subject to strict
contractual confidentiality obligations and may be disciplined or
terminated if they fail to meet these obligations.”169
164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Privacy Policy, supra note 127.

168

Id.

169

Id.
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[77] Google’s TOS and Privacy Policy do not provide any means for an
attorney using Google’s services to measure or assess the company’s
protection of confidential information stored or processed through the
services. Not only does Google expressly decline to make any specific
promises about its services—including the security of information stored
on Google servers—it also requires business users to indemnify Google
for any lawsuits “arising from or related to the use of the Services.”170
[78] Google’s Privacy Policy also makes no commitments regarding
security of customers’ information. Indeed, whatever restrictions the
privacy policy places on dissemination of information are restricted to
“personal information,”171 which is a considerably narrower category than
information that lawyers may consider to be confidential. Google’s
“license” to the content of documents stored on its servers and its right to
make “derivative works” are also troublesome from the point of view of
maintaining client confidentiality for information stored on Google’s
services.172
[79] Amazon similarly limits its liability for its “cloud drive,” which
provides remote storage for documents, by stating that
(a) in no event will our or our software licensors’ total liability
to you for all damages (other than as may be required by
applicable law in cases involving personal injury) arising
170

Google Terms of Service, supra note 108.
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See Key Terms, supra note 128 (defining “personal information” as “information
which you provide to us which personally identifies you, such as your name, e[-]mail
address or billing information, or other data which can be reasonably linked to such
information by Google.”).
172

See Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 248–50 (“There are probably few, if any,
clients that would be willing to agree to grant a cloud vendor a right to any content that
the client may generate or that its attorneys may generate through the use of a cloudbased, word-processing program such as Google Docs. A lawyer or law firm would
certainly also be unwilling to agree to grant such a license.”).
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out of or related to your use or inability to use the Software
exceed the amount of fifty dollars ($50.00);
(b) in no event will our total liability to you for all damages
arising from your use of the Service or information,
materials or products included on or otherwise made
available to you through the Service (excluding the
Software), exceed the amount you paid for the Service
related to your claim for damages; and
(c) we have no liability for any loss, damage or
misappropriation of Your Files under any circumstances or
for any consequences related to changes, restrictions,
suspensions or termination of the Service or the
Agreement. These limitations will apply to you even if the
remedies fail of their essential purpose.173
Cloud service providers like Google and Amazon also make it difficult for
attorneys to assure that they will be informed by the providers of any
breach of security in the system. Under Google and other providers’ TOS,
there is “no assurance that a customer would be given any explanation of
faults in the system.” 174 Moreover, most public cloud computing
providers, like Amazon and Google, make no commitments regarding the
preservation and retrieval of documents from their services nor do they
affirmatively state that they will provide information to users about
security compromises.175 “It is, therefore, questionable whether a lawyer
or law firm who relinquishes control over the storage of its data would be
acting reasonably when it has little to no control over security
breaches.”176 Because state data breach notification laws pertain only to
personal data, there is no legal obligation for public cloud providers to
173

Amazon Cloud Drive Terms of Use, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201376540, archived at
http://perma.cc/KJX3-GMVS (last updated Nov. 11, 2014).
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Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 201–02.
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See id. at 206–07 (noting that Amazon's agreement removed any such assurances).
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Id. at 220–21.
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provide notice to users regarding compromise of non-personal data such as
confidential documents stored on a service.177
[80] Cloud computing also entails more general security concerns. A
2010 article by Christopher Soghoian argues that security concerns are
inherent to cloud computing and thus “render[] the cloud computing
model fundamentally unfit for the practice of law.”178 These “inherent”
risks include transmittal of user names and passwords to servers via
unencrypted network connections, transmittal of data that “‘can easily be
snooped on by hackers’” and encryption that is restricted to initial login
information.179 The Cloud Security Alliance has also assembled a list of
the top nine security risks to the cloud: “(1) [d]ata [b]reaches; (2) [d]ata
[l]oss;” (3) account [or service traffic] hijacking; (4) insecure [interfaces
and] APIs; “(5) [d]enial of [s]ervice; (6) [m]alicious [i]nsiders; (7) [a]buse
of [c]loud [s]ervices; (8) [i]nsufficient [d]ue [d]iligence;” and “(9)
[s]hared [t]echnology [i]ssues.”180 Although these threats are not unique
to the cloud, they demonstrate that lawyers do not avoid security issues
when using the cloud any more than they do with their own in-house
computing services.
VII. LAWYERS’ USE OF E-MAIL, CLOUD COMPUTING, AND
TECHNOLOGY
[81] Given the security challenges to confidential information sent
through e-mails or stored with public cloud providers, lawyers should
exercise greater care using these technologies than they have done in the
177

See id. at 219–21.

178

Bostick, supra note 140, at 1380.
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Id. at 1395–96 (citing Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy,
Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 359, 372 (2010)).
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CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, THE NOTORIOUS NINE: CLOUD COMPUTING TOP
THREATS IN 2013 6–7 (2013), available at
https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/top_threats/The_Notorious_Nine_
Cloud_Computing_Top_Threats_in_2013.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/KBX2-A7R4.
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past. Although ethics bodies have approved the use of both e-mail and
cloud computing, they have done so with the important proviso that
lawyers must reassess the propriety of using the technologies as both the
technology and security risks continue to evolve. What may have been
“reasonable” security in the past may no longer be adequate. Given risks
of exposure of confidential documents and e-mails—as exemplified by the
SPE breach—lawyers should consider whether it is appropriate to entrust
highly confidential client information to unencrypted e-mail and cloud
services.
[82] Although encryption is increasingly inexpensive and is used in
many businesses, it is not yet widely used by lawyers. 181 But as lawyers
come to understand the inherent security risks in e-mail and in cloud
computing, they should consider using encryption, particularly for e-mails
and documents containing sensitive information, such as client
confidential documents and protected health information under HIPAA.182
[83] Like their clients, lawyers must put their own houses in order by
implementing security measures and incident responses plans for security
incidents and their aftermath.183 A key aspect of security preparedness is
training law firm personnel, including lawyers themselves. Even senior
partners are not immune to phishing attacks and misuse of public
document sharing sitessuch as Dropbox or Boxwhich are “built to
handle consumer data, with no true security safeguards, no ability to audit,

181

See Law Firm File Sharing in 2014, supra note 147, at 1 (indicating that 89% of firms
reported using e-mail and 74% use it on a daily basis, but that lawyers generally do not
use encryption and instead use confidentiality statements in the e-mails); Scott Aurnou,
Lawyers and Email: Ethical & Security Considerations, SECURITY ADVOCATE (July 8,
2014), http://www.thesecurityadvocate.com/2014/07/08/lawyers-and-email-ethicalsecurity-considerations/, archived at http://perma.cc/9A5T-4RU3 (noting that
confidentiality statements “essentially do[] nothing to protect firm or client data from any
nefarious actors who view it . . . .”).
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See Aurnou, supra note 181.
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See id. (discussing the need of lawyers and law firms to put in place security response
plans).
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and no redundancy or backups.”184
[84] Law firms should also assess whether they need to put into place
policies and procedures prohibiting certain practices that increase the
danger of dissemination of confidential information. These policies may
encompass topics such as using public cloud providers or file sharing
services for sharing documents, the use of web-based e-mail services, and
use of public cloud computing providers for sensitive documents. Instead
of using public cloud services, lawyers might use “enterprise-grade file
sharing services that focus on the security and protections designed with
law firms in mind.”185 As earlier noted, if lawyers do use public storage or
file sharing services, they should consider using encryption for
confidential or proprietary documents.186
[85] Given recent ethical opinions, it is clear that lawyers must also
continue to keep abreast of security risks posed by technology to fulfill
their duties of competence and confidentiality. Although not every lawyer
must be a specialist in technology, the days when some in the profession
could afford to be technophobes are over. Like their clients, lawyers share
the burden of preserving sensitive and proprietary data against attacks and
unauthorized exposure.
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